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ABSTRACT 
 
Policy changes in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) can be explained in terms 
of the exhaustion and long-term contradictions of policy instruments.  Changes in 
policy instruments have reoriented the policy without any change in formal Treaty 
goals.   The social and economic efficacy of instruments in terms of evidence-based 
policy analysis was a key factor in whether they were delegitimized.   The original 
policy instruments were generally dysfunctional, but reframing the policy in terms of 
a multifunctionality paradigm permitted the development of more efficacious 
instruments.   A dynamic interaction takes place between the instruments and policy 
informed by the predominant discourses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis of policy instruments presents a new lens to examine the familiar 
territory of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), generating fresh insights and 
understandings.   Standard accounts of the CAP have often either neglected policy 
instruments or treated them as secondary administrative devices, neglecting their 
capacity to be tools for understanding policy change and power relations, although an 
exceptions is Greer (2005: 174-84)..    The policy instruments approach allows us to 
detect and examine policy change.   For example, it helps understanding of how some 
policy changes are best explained by the exhaustion and long-term contradictions of 
policy instruments.   They thus deserve a more central place in public policy analysis.    
This article, following the insight of Lescoumes and Le Galès (2004a, 2004b, 2007), 
will show that they offer a mixture of the technical and social and are the bearers of 
values, a combination that is particularly apparent in the case of the CAP.    Issues of 
inclusion and exclusion and the privileging of certain actors are also evident in the 
case of the CAP.    Symbolism co-exists with more concrete attempts to shape actor 
behaviour.     The analysis thus provides a means of understanding the relationship 
between the governing and the governed in a sector where that relationship has had a 
long duration and has been particularly intense and complex. 
      This article outlines the main changes in policy instruments in the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the recent past with reference to the principal drivers of 
those changes.  It then outlines the principal policy instruments used in the CAP since 
its inception with reference to how they are chosen.  Because there are so many policy 
instruments it has been necessary to focus on those that operate or have operated 
across the CAP as a whole (or most parts of it) rather than in particular commodity 
regimes.    The process by which instruments lose their legitimacy and become 
obsolete is assessed.  The success of the recent shift in policy instruments will be 
reviewed with reference to their deployment and their co-management by the 
Commission and the member states.   The article will conclude with a review of the 
effectiveness of the instruments, how they structure public policies and how power 
relations affect choice and change with respect to policy instruments. 
Some key considerations 
This paper shares the insight of Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007: 3) „that instruments 
at work are not neutral devices: they produce specific effects, independently of the 
objective pursued … which structure public policy according to their own logic.‟  An 
observation that is particularly relevant to the CAP is: 
      Public policy instrumentation is … a means of orienting relations between  
      political society (via the administrative executive) and civil society (via its 
      administered subjects) through intermediaries in the form of devices that mix 
      technical components (measuring, calculating, the rule of law, procedure) and 
      social components (representation, symbol).  (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007: 7) 
This sometimes uneasy combination of the technical and the social is very typical of 
the CAP.   On the one hand, it has involved highly technical policy instruments that 
are understood fully by only a very few people and perhaps not even by those who 
claim to understand them.    However, the CAP also resonates with symbolism, 
embedded as it in often emotive concepts such as the family farm or la campagne.   
Thus, public policy instruments „are bearers of values, fuelled by one interpretation of 
the social and by precise notions of the mode of regulation envisaged.‟   (Lascoumes 
and Le Galès, 2007: 4).    In relation to the CAP, one has to be aware of the way in 
which instruments as institutions „eventually privilege certain actors and interests and 
exclude others.‟   (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007: 9).    The general effect of the 
CAP has been to privilege the input industries such as machinery and agrochemicals; 
traders in food; and large-scale farmers.   In other words, already powerful groups 
have had their power reinforced.   All political processes produce winners and losers 
and involve inclusion and exclusion, but the stakes are higher when the gains and 
losses are distributed across different countries and different sectors of farming as 
they are in the CAP.    
        In the case of the CAP, one also has to be aware that governance has far from 
displaced government.   To some extent the CAP has been insulated from the changes 
noted in the contemporary period by Lascoumes and Le Galès (2004a: 21-22) in terms 
of „the transformation of the modes of government/governance, the links between 
public authorise and economic and social actors, in a context of internationalization, 
the modalities of regulation, and the restructuring of the state.‟  [Author‟s translation 
from French original]  Of course, the CAP is formed within a multi-level regional 
government structure and is influenced by international trade negotiations, but 
nevertheless displays strong elements of path dependency (Kay 2003) and resistance 
to change.  Thus the CAP does not meet the tests of being „less hierarchized, less 
organized within a sector demarcated, or structured by powerful interest groups‟.  
(Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007: 2).   Throughout, however, this article seeks to be 
aware of the central insight that instruments can structure policies. 
      Garzon (2006: 10) argues that „Were the founders of the CAP in 1958 to come 
back today, they would not recognise this policy, its objectives and its instruments‟.   
It can be argued that they would recognize the policy and its objectives if not the 
instruments, particularly given that the CAP objectives as set out in Article 39 of the 
Treaty of Rome have not been changed or modified unlike other parts of the treaty.   
There is an interesting contrast here with Palier‟s analysis of instruments in the case 
of funded pensions in France.   He shows that, despite path-dependent forces, the 
incremental expansion of new instruments lead to cumulative change and a profound 
transformation in the pension system.    „The development of a new instrument … 
may in fact signify an overall change‟.  (Palier, 2007: 102).  Of course, it is possible 
for policy content to change without the objectives being formally altered.   One 
problem with the original objectives was that they were not prioritized, nor in some 
cases, particularly in relation to farm income, specified in a way that could readily be 
operationalized.    Agricultural economists were concerned from the early years of the 
CAP about „the impossibility of realising the multiple objectives of Article 39 … by 
means of a single instrument, namely price policy.‟   (Garzon, 2006: 33). 
The original choice of instruments 
Following the lead given by Lascoumes et le Galès in their book (2004) what 
conditions/actor constellations lay behind the original choice of CAP instruments and 
what were the consequences, intended and unintended?    A full answer to this 
question would require extensive research in the Commission archives and those of 
member states: a start in this direction was made by Knudsen (2001).    By reviewing 
the secondary literature we can identify some stylised facts as far as the 
constellations/actors were concerned: 
 The six original member states but especially France and Germany played a 
key role in shaping the policy and its instruments. 
 The Commission played an important role in the technical development of the 
relevant instruments, but then had to negotiate about its plans with the Council 
and the farm organizations. 
 In terms of agency, the first Agriculture commissioner, Sicco Mansholt from 
the Netherlands who held office from 1958 to 1972 played a key role in 
shaping the policy.   He had a federalist orientation and saw the CAP as a key 
building block for a more integrated Europe. 
What developed was a policy made up of „the sum of agricultural policies operating in 
the member states‟.    Thus, „Despite the fact that they had failed to achieve their 
goals nationally, the very same policy instruments were built into the CAP.‟ 
(Knudsen, 2006: 196).   
        The interaction between the Commission, the Council and the farm organizations 
in the design of the CAP led to „a more extensive system, involving much more 
intervention than the Commission had proposed.‟   (Tracy, 1989: 255).   However, 
one cannot simply explain this in terms of a billiard ball interaction between the key 
actors (DG VI; Commissioners; Council/member states; farm organizations), although 
that is part of the story.   One also has to take account of the prevalent discourses that 
shaped the debate and could be used to legitimate particular decisions.   Three can be 
that were particularly influential were concerns about food security; a belief that 
markets could never work properly in agriculture; and a concern about the income gap 
between urban and rural populations. 
      It is evident that the initial selection of policy instruments for the CAP had a range 
of unintended consequences.   In particular, they had created structural surpluses of 
particular products and they also placed considerable strain on the budget of the 
European Community.   These led to a number of reforms of the CAP of which the 
most significant were the 1992 or MacSharry reforms which „changed for the first 
time the CAP‟s policy instruments, implying a real rupture with the historic model of 
the CAP.‟  (Cunha and Swinbank, 2009: 244).  In broad terms these reforms initiated 
the break of the link between production and subsidies or „decoupling‟ as it is known 
in the jargon.   This meant that farmers no longer had to (over) produce to receive a 
subsidy.     
      The „Fischler‟ reforms of 2003 led to further significant changes.  (Swinnen, 
2008)  In terms of stylised facts the new shape of the policy post 2003 may be 
summarized as follows: 
 The replacement of measures designed to support and encourage production 
by measures designed to provide income support to farmers not linked to 
production, hence measures that have less effect on „the way in which actors 
are going to behave‟ (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007: 9). 
 A greater emphasis on forms of support designed to ensure that farming 
continues to supply positive externalities in the form of public goods. 
 A greater emphasis on policy measures that are horizontal (across the board) 
in their application rather than vertical (directed at particular commodities or 
categories of farmer). 
 A trend towards denationalization of the CAP with more decisions being taken 
at the member state or regional level. 
The policy instruments 
Our consideration of policy instruments in the CAP seeks to pursue the question of 
delegitimation: what is the process by which (some) instruments lose legitimacy and 
become obsolete?   Lascoumes and Le Galés (2007b: 360-61) take forward the work 
of Hood to develop a typology of types of instrument and the corresponding type of 
legitimacy.   For the purposes of this discussion, the CAP policy instruments are seen 
as predominantly economic and fiscal, notably subventions of various kinds in which 
case legitimacy is derived from „Recherche d‟une utilité collective‟ and „Efficacité 
sociale et économique‟.   The succeeding discussion will show that considerable 
emphasis is placed on the economic and social efficacy of CAP instruments. 
        In order to bring some order to a complex topic, the discussion is broken down 
into three categories: 
 Policy instruments that have been dropped or are effectively defunct (green 
currencies/switchover mechanism; monetary compensation amount; objective 
method; target price; threshold price; variable import levy; guarantee 
thresholds;  budgetary stabilisers; butter disposal aids) 
 Policy instruments that are still in place, but are likely to diminish in 
importance over time or in some cases disappear (intervention purchasing 
(including distillation);  export subsidies; quotas;  co-responsibility payments;  
set aside; tariffs) 
 Relatively new policy instruments that are likely to be of importance in 
shaping the CAP in the future (decoupling; single farm payment; modulation; 
cross-compliance;  financial discipline mechanism; IACS) 
Policy instruments that have disappeared 
 
One set of policy instruments was connected with the fiendishly complex green 
money system of the CAP which was abolished with the the arrival of the euro.    This 
originated in the French devaluation and German revaluation of their currencies in 
1969.  In order to shield French consumers from further price rises, changes in the 
way in which the unit of account was translated into farm supports in national 
currencies was phased in.   Hence, a supposedly temporary system of border taxes and 
subsidies known as monetary compensation amounts was produced to sustain 
agricultural trading as if common prices still existed.    Each member state then went 
on to develop its own green currency which were used as instruments of national 
economic policy and formed part of annual CAP price negotiations.    
     Following the introduction of the European Monetary System (EMS), a green ECU 
was introduced in 1984 based on the strongest currency in the EMS (normally the 
Deutschmark).   This involved the introduction of a switchover mechanism 
accompanied by a correcting coefficient.   The 1984 changes had three important 
effects: they reduced transparency, they increased complexity to the benefit of larger 
traders who understood how to manipulate the system; and it pushed prices by 1994 
20 per cent higher than they would otherwise have been.   (Grant, 1997: 88-90).   In 
short, those who gained were those who were already significant beneficiaries from 
the CAP.  Originally a stopgap solution to a particular problem, this increasingly 
complex system had unintended consequences in terms of beneficiaries and the CAP 
budget.  This undermined its legitimacy, not least among decision makers, but a 
higher level policy decision, the introduction of the euro, rendered it obsolete. 
      Critics of the objective method have argued that it was neither objective nor a 
method.   Yet „For a brief period in the mid-1970s the “objective method” was viewed 
by many observers as a precise tool which would allow the Commission of the 
European Communities to prepare in a scientific fashion its annual package of farm 
price proposals for consideration by the Council.‟  (Swinbank, 1979: 303).   „In short, 
the method entailed calculating the percentage increase in guaranteed prices necessary 
to keep incomes of “modern” farms in line with non-farm incomes.‟   (Phillips, 1990: 
54).    In practice there was considerable disagreement over the figures, complicated 
by the distortions introduced by the green currency system, and the whole matter 
became highly political and essentially subjective.   „As the years passed, references 
to the objective method became fewer until, by 1982, it was being referred to [by the 
Commission] as the “so-called” objective method …. Effectively the concept was 
dead.‟   (Fennell, 1997: 99). 
      Three lessons can be learnt from the sad history of the objective method.  First, it 
reflected a period in the CAP when the institutional power of farmers at a Community 
level, as embodied in the Comité des Organizations Professionelles Agricoles  
(COPA), was at its height, showing how power relations can be exhibited in policy 
instruments.    Second, it shows the difficulty of devising some acceptable statistical 
measure that can guide policy on matters relating to incomes.   Third, „The history of 
the objective method is a good illustration of the difficulties encountered in the use of 
price policy as the main means of supporting farmers‟ incomes.‟  (Fennell, 1997: 99).    
The method lost legitimacy because its claim to objectivity was clearly not well 
founded: in other words, evidence-based policy making overcame the pursuit of 
particular interests under a mask of instrumental neutrality. 
     The CAP as it operated before the Uruguay Round reforms was based on a system 
of price supports which were originally devised for the cereals regime with the 
intention of maintaining high grain prices.   „The choice of the original instruments 
had major economic and institutional consequences.‟  (Grazon, 2006: 25).   Each year 
the Council of Ministers set a target price for each commodity in the CAP.   The hope 
was that farmers would receive a price from the market approaching that price.    It 
was necessary to protect farmers from commodities entering the common market at 
lower prices.     The threshold price (sometimes known as the minimum import price) 
„was the at-frontier equivalent of the target price, the difference between the two 
being the cost of internal transport.‟  (Fennell, 1997: 190).   Thus, on a given day the 
lowest price of a consignment of grain which met quality standards that was landed at 
Rotterdam which be adjusted to account for the cost of transporting it to, for example, 
Duisburg in the Ruhr which was judged to be the place in Germany in which grain 
was in shortest supply.   A variable import levy would then be used to make up the 
difference between the frontier price and the threshold price.   Any attempt to cut the 
frontier price would simply result in an increase in the levy.   After the Uruguay 
Round, the variable import levy was replaced in July 1995 by tariffs which were 
thought to be more transparent, hence there was no longer any need to calculate a 
variable import levy on a daily basis.    An international discourse about transparency 
undermined the legitimacy of the levy. 
     Guarantee thresholds were introduced in 1982 in an attempt to limit the growing 
budgetary costs of the CAP by getting producers to contribute to some of the costs of 
excess production.   These were ineffectively implemented and were rapidly 
discredited.   Curbs on production were reinvented in 1987 as budgetary stabilizers.   
These used the concept of the „maximum production quantity‟, later to be called the 
„maximum guaranteed quantity‟.   „The difference between this and the discredited 
guarantee threshold lay in the immediacy of the response to a production overrun, and 
its automatic enforcement by the Commission‟.  (Fennell, 1997: 167).  In some 
respects, the terminology was misleading as „the original proposal was for a budget 
stabilizer mechanism, whereby adjustments to the CAP would be made if spending 
exceeded a specified level.  Considered politically unacceptable, this was replaced by 
a stabilizer triggered by production exceeding a specified level instead‟.    (Ackrill, 
2000: 63).     In any event, „it was a false dawn.‟  (Fennell, 1997: 168).   Tinkering 
with the system of price support (and the actual cuts in prices were minimal) was not 
going to overcome the problem of excess production when farmers had to produce in 
order to cash in their subsidy.   A method of providing support that was not linked to 
production was needed and this is what the MacSharry reforms and subsequent 
reforms sought to achieve.   The policy instrument lost legitimacy because it was 
simply not efficacious. 
        Policy instruments disappeared to some extent because of changes in other 
policy areas (currency policy and trade policy) rather than within the CAP itself.   In 
terms of legitimacy, one can see policy measures being delegitimized because they 
were unduly complex, not efficacious, had unintended consequences in terms of 
beneficiaries, had undesirable price or budget effects or were inconsistent with the 
new emphasis on transparency as a criterion for judging policy instruments.  The shift 
away from price policy is having a continuing effect and is likely to lead to further 
policy instruments disappearing or diminishing in importance as we shall see in the 
next section. 
Policy instruments that still exist but are declining 
Intervention purchasing was one of the keystones of the price support system.   The 
intervention price was set somewhat below the threshold price but above the world 
market price.    Produce could be sold to official intervention agencies in each 
member state provided that it met certain quality standards (which were tightened up 
over time as a means of reducing the growth of intervention stocks).   This created a 
risk free market for produce and led to the appearance of the famous butter 
mountains, wine lakes etc.   Intervention is being phased out, either by reducing the 
intervention price to near world market levels (although there can still be purchasing 
if there is over supply or the world market price falls) or by abolishing the instrument 
altogether in relation to particular commodities.   
      The fall in dairy prices led the EU to start purchasing butter and skimmed milk 
powder again in 2009.   However, intervention is now only for a limited period of 
time each year and buying is triggered only if the market price in a particular member 
state falls below a threshold level.    Moreover, intervention purchases are capped at a 
maximum of 40,000t in 2007 and 30,000t a year from 2007 onward.  Intervention 
purchasing has been delegitimized by the new policy discourse which argues that 
farm support measures should be structured so as not to encourage farmers to over 
produce.   
      In the case of the complex CAP wine regime, the preferred intervention 
instrument has been distillation which aims to withdraw production surpluses from 
the market at a guaranteed minimum price.   The wine is the processed into alcohol 
which is used partly for sale as potable alcohol and partly for the fuel market.   The 
Commission has been particularly critical of crisis distillation which occurs when the 
market is seriously disturbed.     The wine reform agreed in December 2007 moves 
away from the distillation of surplus production towards a more market oriented 
sector, although it will be permitted from national envelopes for a further four years.    
Distillation as a policy instrument lost credibility with decision-makers and analysts 
because it did not deal with the central problem of over production of wine for which 
there was no market. 
      Export subsidies formed the last element in the system of price support and 
protection in the classical CAP.   Typically this was paid to private traders and known 
as a refund or restitution „equal to the difference between the intervention price and 
the world price and in fact the bulk of surplus produce has been disposed of in this 
way.‟  (Ritson, 1997: 6).   Export subsidies have been particularly controversial in 
international trade negotiations because they can drive domestic producers out of 
business and also disrupt third country markets.    Preliminary agreements reached in 
the Doha Development Round include an EU offer to phase them out by 2013, 
although they were reintroduced for dairy products in 2009.  They have lost 
legitimacy as a consequence of evidence-based criticisms from organizations 
concerned with the Global South such as Oxfam. 
      Intervention purchasing, export subsidies and protection from international 
competition tended to lead to over production in member states, resulting in structural 
surpluses of commodities such as milk.   The CAP therefore introduced a number of 
policy instruments designed to restrain production, of which quotas were one of the 
most important.   Quotas had been introduced, rather unsuccessfully, in the sugar 
sector in 1967, and they won little favour as a general policy instrument in the 1970s 
    .   Nevertheless, they were used from 1984 as a means of addressing the problems 
of the dairy sector which was producing a heavy strain on the EC budget.      „Dairy 
farmers had particularly strong incentives to produce a surplus as they could use low-
cost cereal substitutes and soybeans for feed while the EC guaranteed them a high 
price for whatever amount of milk they marketed.   Dairy stocks, by 1983, exceeded 
all other EC stocks in value and were increasing rapidly.‟   (Moyer and Josling, 1990: 
67).  Milk quotas advantaged existing producers over potential new entrants as they 
gave those already in production a windfall capital asset which new entrants had to 
acquire.   Member states had to decide whether and how quotas could be traded and 
whether arrangements were made to make quota available for new entrants.   Despite 
the existence of a single market, quotas could not be traded across the borders of 
member states.    The use of quotas had the general effect of slowing down adjustment 
in a sector which was uncompetitive by international standards, particularly in terms 
of size of farm.    
     The quota regime will expire in 2015.    Although seen as an expedient solution to 
a particular policy problem, it produced a number of undesirable unintended 
consequences which were made apparent by evidence-based policy analysis, 
triggering a process of delegitimization. 
      The notion of co-responsibility was favoured by the Commission throughout the 
late 1970s and 1980s as a means of restoring market balance, but resisted by the 
member states.    The basic idea was to support production into two parts, one part to 
be supported entirely by the price policy while „the cost of the other part would be 
divided between the Community and the producers according to some formula, which 
could vary from one commodity to another.‟  (Fennell, 1997: 157).   It was „intended 
as a way of getting farmers to share the (budgetary) consequences of their actions.‟  
(Ackrill, 2000: 54).  The co-responsibility levy for milk was introduced in 1977 and 
used to finance market development measures, market surveys or product research as 
well as certain disposal measures.   As a policy instrument, it was never a great 
success as it was never more than 3 per cent of the target price and was offset by 
increases in support prices and manipulation of the green currency system.    It was 
abolished from 1993 as part of the MacSharry reforms.    A three per cent co-
responsibility levy was introduced in cereals in 1986-7 and increased to five per cent 
for large farmers in 1991-2, but was also abolished as part of the MacSharry reforms.      
      Notionally, the policy instrument still operates which is why it is included in this 
section:  What is of interest here is why a policy instrument which was favoured by 
the Commission and was sensible in principle (making the producers pay part of the 
cost of the surplus disposal) „had a chequered history.‟  (Hubbard and Ritson, 1997: 
90).  The problem was the lack of linkage with the predominant set of policy 
instruments at the time, price support.    The overall support price could be forced up, 
often in a non-transparent way when the green currencies were operating, thus 
transferring the levy to consumers as a tax paid through raised prices.    „Even so, it 
was an unpopular measure with farmers.‟  (Hubbard and Ritson, 1997: 90).   No doubt 
they would have contested the notion of being penalized for increasing production 
which was the main emphasis of policy in the immediate post-war period.   Hence, 
one had a policy instrument that was both ineffective and unpopular, problems 
leading to its eventual effective abandonment by its Commission sponsors. 
     Set-aside was introduced as a compulsory measure as part of the MacSharry 
reforms.   Farmers growing arable crops were required to „set aside‟ a fixed 
proportion of their land and not cultivate it (or at least not grow crops within the 
CAP).   It was thus a functional equivalent of quotas in the dairy sectors in the sense 
that it was supposed to place physical constraints on production.    One problem was 
that farmers were inclined to set aside their least productive land so that the impact on 
production was less than forecast.    It was seen as a rather blunt policy instrument.  
The set aside rate was set at zero for the 2007-8 harvest, effectively abandoning the 
policy instrument which is to be scrapped altogether.  Even before increasing food 
prices arising in part from supply shortages made it look irrelevant, it had been 
perceived as an ineffective policy instrument, even though it had some defenders 
among conservation groups. 
       What we have seen in this section is the decline in importance of a range of 
policy instruments because of a shift in the nature of the CAP itself.    In its original 
form „policy instruments were used for a threefold purpose of securing high prices on 
the EU domestic market, insulating the European producers from international 
markets and accelerating structural adaptation through a limited set of structural 
measures.‟ (Garzon, 2006: 39).   The reforms initiated in 2002 „had fundamental 
consequences for policy instruments.‟   (Garzon, 2006: 52).   Assistance has 
„progressively changed from an economic to a social support for agriculture.‟   
(Garzon, 2006: 52).   As the old family of policy instruments has started to fade away, 
new ones have been put in their place. 
Relatively new policy instruments that are likely to shape the future CAP 
The new generation of CAP policy instruments reflects a shift from market to income 
support and rules that, because they are linked with environmental and rural 
development objectives, are more horizontal in character, i.e., they are less sector 
specific.   In part, this is a reflection of the growing influence of environmental 
organizations on the reform process.  (Cunha and Swinbank, 2009).  These 
instruments may nevertheless not have as clear a relationship between goals and 
implementation mechanisms as might be hoped for: 
     Having evolved out of a complex mixture of market instruments and direct 
     payments, [the single farm payment] is trying to be an „income support‟, a  
     „compensation payment‟ and a „land-management‟ payment all in one.   It is 
     a blunt and non-targeted policy instrument which, in trying to achieve a lot of 
     things at once, will probably achieve none very well, if at all.   (Atkin, 2007: 35) 
     Decoupling is at the heart of the reformed CAP.   The idea is that payments are no 
longer linked to production, thus qualifying the instrument through which decoupling 
is applied, the single farm payment to placed in the „green box‟ of the WTO as a non-
trade distorting measure, although it is far from certain that the SFP does qualify for 
placement in the green box.    Originally temporary payments, the SFPs have acquired 
a semi-permanent character, Commissioner Fischer Boel stating that they „will be 
with us for a long time to come‟ (Agra Europe, 30 March 2007: EP/2) which means 
they are likely to survive after 2013 when the next major overhaul of the CAP is 
anticipated to take place.     
      SFPs are now being bought and sold through agricultural brokers or internet sites.  
This is not an unintended consequence of the policy instrument.  When the SFP was 
set up, farmers were given the right to trade subsidy entitlements between themselves, 
on the model of quota trading. This makes sense as it allows individual farmers to 
adjust their own businesses in the light of their assessment of market conditions.  The 
market that has developed does enable farmers to raise funds to retire or to invest in 
their business. But that could have been achieved by the conversion of subsidies into 
bonds.  What appears to be a perfectly rational aspect of the SFP policy instrument in 
the sense that it is goal related has stirred up controversy about the whole policy as it 
does not seem consistent with notions of legitimation through „une utilité collective.‟  
(Lescoumes and Le Galès, 2007b: 361).   In that sense debate about the policy 
instrument could configure the policy. 
     There are three alternative models for determining the calculation of payments to 
farmers which vary by member state and in some member states by region, reflecting 
a denationalization process within the CAP.   Of these, the historical model, used in 
ten member states or regions of them, perpetuates the existing distribution of 
payments whereas flat-rate payments per hectare undermine them.   In order to 
cushion these effects, some member states employ a combination of the historical and 
flat-rate models. 
      The extent of decoupling varies by member state.   Under Article 69 of Regulation 
1782/03 a member state can channel up to ten per cent of the single payment envelope 
to provide additional support to types of farming important for the environment and/or 
improving the quality and marketing of products.    For example, Scotland uses this 
provision to retain ten per cent of aid to support the beef sector.     There is also scope 
for other forms of re-coupling which can be up to one hundred per cent for a specific 
commodity.  Indeed, only four member states have opted for full decoupling: Ireland, 
Malta, Luxembourg and the UK (except Scotland) with France using complex forms 
of retained coupling. 
     All this might seem to be a recipe for increased complexity at a time when there is 
supposedly a policy impetus towards simplification.     However, the Commission‟s 
view is that these arrangements are largely transitional.    Commissioner Fischer Boel 
recently stated, „Production-linked payments to farmers are on the way out.  Nearly 
90% of direct payments will be decoupled by 2010.‟   (Farmers Weekly, 18 May 
2007).   
     The meaning of modulation has changed over time.   In the context of the 
MacSharry reforms it meant the transfer of funding from larger to smaller farms.  The 
idea of this form of socio-economic modulation has not disappeared entirely from the 
CAP reform agenda but it is now usually expressed in the notion of capping, i.e., of 
not providing additional subsidies to farms beyond a certain size.    The idea was 
revived in the context of the CAP Health Check, but encountered the customary 
resistance from Britain and Germany and was dropped.   This reveals the influence 
that large-scale farmers are able to exert on policy instruments. 
      Modulation now normally refers either to the compulsory or voluntary transfer of 
funds from Pillar 1 of the CAP, guarantee expenditure and single farm payments, to 
Pillar 2 which is concerned with rural development policy including agri-
environmental measures.    These had been introduced on an EU-wide basis as part of 
the MacSharry reforms with all member states required to develop such schemes with 
co-financing from the EU.     
     Modulation was introduced on a voluntary basis as part of the Agenda 2000 CAP 
reform, but was not generally taken up by member states.   The 2003 reform made it 
compulsory applying to SFPs and other direct aids at a rate of 3 per cent in 2005, 4 
per cent in 2006 and 5 per cent from 2007 onwards.       Modulation reductions in 
direct payments will not apply to the new member states until 2013.   Following a 
dispute involving the European Parliament in the spring of 2007, voluntary 
modulation is confined to the two countries that are interested in applying it, Portugal 
and the United Kingdom.   There is concern that allowing extensive voluntary 
modulation would undermine a Common Agricultural Policy.  The 2008 Health Check 
agreement on compulsory modulation will increase it from the current 5 per cent to 10 
per cent by 2012 with all funds kept by the member state.   There is a supplementary 
rate of modulation of 4 per cent for large holdings, but this only applies to amounts 
above €300,000, increased from a threshold of €100,000 after strong German 
pressure. 
       If modulation is not popular with farmers as they seen it as increasing the 
difficulty of funds which they see as rightfully theirs, cross-compliance is even less 
popular.  Indeed, Commissioner Fischer Boel conceded in January 2007 that „most 
farmers consider cross-compliance to be a pain in the [backside].‟   (Agra Focus, 
April 2007: 11).   Nevertheless, it is seen as a central policy instrument of the 
reformed CAP both in terms of promoting sustainability and making it more 
acceptable to consumers and taxpayers.   In particular: 
     Cross-compliance creates a link between the full payment of support, and 
     compliance with certain rules relating to agricultural land and to agricultural 
     land in the areas of  the environment, public, animal and plant health, animal 
     welfare and good agricultural and environmental condition.   The link is  
     expressed in concrete terms in the possibility, if the rules are not respected, of 
     full or partial reductions of certain EU agricultural payments.‟   (European 
     Commission, 2007: 2) 
     The Commission admits that „Cross-compliance may indeed represent a challenge 
as it often results in a rather bulky set of rules which were previously implemented 
independently of each other‟.   (European Commission, 2007: 2).   Of course, many of 
these rules cover what should be followed as best farming practice or even legal 
requirements in any case.   They may be divided into two categories: statutory 
management requirements which are in force throughout the EU and good agricultural 
and environmental condition (GAEC) requirements where member states are 
permitted to define minimum requirements on the basis of a European framework.  
The statutory requirements cover environmental regulations; animal record keeping; 
animal and plant diseases; and animal welfare. 
      The 2003 reforms introduced a financial discipline mechanism by which direct 
payments to farmers would be reduced if the annual agricultural budget ceiling was 
exceeded.   The CAP has been under budget in the recent past, but it is anticipated 
that SFPs will be cut by 7 per cent a year by 2013 under the Financial Discipline 
Mechanism.    This will result from the continued phasing-in of direct aids in the new 
member states while the addition of Bulgaria and Romania has taken the SPS 
payment budget beyond the Pillar 1 budget ceiling. 
     The Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) is a highly complex 
system for the administration of the CAP necessitated by the introduction of direct 
payments to farmers as part of the MacSharry reforms.   One feature has been the use 
of near earth satellites to ensure that crops are being grown where it is claimed that 
they are being cultivated, leading in one case to the discovery that a farmer had made 
a claim for „fields‟ located in mid Atlantic.   The transaction costs involved in IACS, 
for the Commission, the implementing authorities in the member states and farmers 
have been a subject of criticism.    However, in the context of its simplification 
strategy, the Commission‟s view is that IACS „has kept the administrative burden for 
farmers at a manageable level while ensuring a high degree of financial security and 
protection of taxpayers‟ money‟ although they are prepared „to consider more 
streamlined procedures‟.   (European Commission, 2005: 3). 
Conclusions 
The paper has noted particular ways in which policy instruments could shape policy, 
e.g., the debate about trading SFPs.   More generally, some of the recently introduced 
policy instruments have opened up scope for re-nationalization of the CAP.   This was 
not the intention, but resulted to some extent from the bargaining process in the 
reform negotiations.   Greer (2005: 208) exaggerates when he states that „there is now 
a “cafeteria CAP”  in which it operates more like a menu from which countries can 
choose those dishes more suited to their individual tastes.‟    Nevertheless, a shift 
away from a common policy has taken place and this allows countries to adapt policy 
instruments to suit their own particular circumstances.   This can in turn create 
anomalies which spark off wider policy debates as in the recent case of policy 
modulation.   Hence, „policy feedback analysis demonstrates the strength of 
apparently minor changes to put pressure on policy mechanisms and produce further 
changes.‟  (Garzon, 2006: 179). 
      Nevertheless, the overall picture does look like one of changes in policy leading to 
changes in policy instruments.   This is because „all reforms since 1992 have tried to 
address the market imbalances created by the original policy instruments based on 
price support‟ leading to „a progressive introduction of new instruments‟ (Garzon, 
2006: 51).   This has been shaped by a vision of multifunctional agriculture in which 
farmers produce positive externalities such as cherished landscapes, alongside high 
quality, value added niche products using environmentally and animal friendly 
production methods.     This mode of production does, however, co-exist with more 
intensive forms of production that are competitive on world markets so there is 
something of a dual model which can give rise to tensions. 
     This might seem to be inconsistent with the argument of Lascoumes et Le Galès 
that instruments can structure policies.   However, this is not necessarily the case.  
First, some examples of instruments structuring the policy debate and hence policy 
design have been identified such as the decoupled payment originally introduced as a 
temporary compensation payment to arable farmers.   Second, the relative paucity of 
such examples may simply demonstrate the existence of agricultural exceptionalism.   
In this respect, the fact that instruments are highly specific to the CAP regime and do 
not include instruments adapted from other sectors is significant.   What is also 
evident from this discussion is the utility of the Lascoumes et Le Galès framework on 
policy legitimation.    It was evident that, as predicted, the social and economic 
efficacy of instruments, as judged by evidence-based policy analysis, was a key factor 
in whether they were delegitimized, although the impact of transparency as a 
discourse was also noted. 
     There is also considerable scope for policy change deriving from the drive to 
simplify the policy instruments used in the CAP.   The CAP has been marked by 
considerable complexity since its inception.   Complexity has had three broad 
consequences: it has increased losses and transaction costs; it has created substantial 
opportunities for fraud; and it has created entry barriers to the political debate.    If the 
drive for simplification is successful, the whole character of the CAP could be 
substantially changed. 
      How effective have these changes in policy instruments been?  Cumulatively they 
have reoriented the policy, even if its formal goals have not been changed.   With the 
exception of cross-compliance, they are also less intrusive at the farm level in the 
sense that they give farmers more scope to make decisions in response to market 
signals.   In deciding which crop to plant (or which form of livestock farming to 
pursue), farmers do not have to consider the subsidy a particular crop would attract, 
but can base the decision of considerations of agronomy and the likely return from the 
market.   This is a substantial change, although the mindset of farmers has become 
adapted to their decision being made in a context of production related subsidies so 
there may be a time lag before the full effects are seen. 
      How do power relations affect choice and change with respect to policy 
instruments?    In particular, how far does the study reveal the changing balance of 
power between different actors in governing the EU?  It was evident in the initial 
formation of the CAP and the choice of policy instruments that although the 
Commission presented the menu of policy choices, the member states, particularly 
France and Germany, made the final selection.    In making these choices, they sought 
advice from the kitchen in the form of the farm organizations.    Over time, the chef 
has lost ground to the consumer: analysts would agree that farm organizations have 
become less powerful in the policy process.   In part this is because the farm 
organizations have found it more difficult to agree between themselves at anything 
more than a lowest common denominator level as the number of member states has 
expanded, increasing the number and range of conflicts of interest.    There has also 
been a failure on the part of most farm organizations to recognize how the debate has 
moved on and to engage on the new terrain which has been occupied by 
environmental, third world and consumer organizations.    This has led to demands to 
which the Commission has responded for a new kind of CAP with different policy 
instruments that focuses on consumption rather than production. 
       Nevertheless, the member states have been effective in protecting particular 
interests, e.g., large farmers in Germany.   The Commission retains considerable 
scope in proposing new policies, but has to use strategic vision and tactical skill to put 
them through the Farm Council in a form that achieves their original intentions. 
(Swinnen, 2008)  The clever design of policy instruments which can deliver real 
change over a period of time is a key element of this political design process.   The 
old style instruments reflected a particular set of objectives centred on maximizing 
productions whereas the newer ones are intended to provide broader public goods 
such as environmental benefits.    In the absence of co-decision the Parliament 
remains largely absent from the decision-making process. 
       The analysis of policy instruments thus helps to show how power relations have 
shifted over time, but the analysis of actor relations is by itself insufficient.   What is 
also needed is an examination of competing discourses and how they are utilized by 
actors in the policy process.   Before the credit crunch significantly rising world food 
prices driven by an imbalance of supply and demand led to a revival of the discourse 
of food security and hence of productionist understandings of agriculture.    This has 
been spearheaded by France which claims that food is too important to be left to the 
market.   Will this mean a revival of the old instruments that have been discarded?   
This will probably not happen because it would be accepted even by supporters of 
productionist discourses that they were not an efficacious means of helping farmers.    
France has been emphasizing the continuation of import tariff protection in particular, 
an instrument that has not been discarded. 
      Many of the original policy instruments used in the CAP became discredited 
because they were highly inefficient means of achieving their objectives and produced 
significant negative externalities.   The principal beneficiaries were often the opposite 
of those intended (prosperous rather than marginal farmers) and the transaction costs 
associated with the instruments were high.  Instruments such as export subsidies 
transferred the costs of adjustment to the rural poor in least developed countries.  
Attempts to repair these deficiencies through the use of instruments such as quotas 
simply introduced new unintended consequences.   Reframing the policy in terms of a 
multifunctionality paradigm permitted the development of new policy instruments 
which had less market distorting effects and emphasized the production of public 
goods such as environmentally friendly agriculture.    There was thus a dynamic 
interaction between the instruments and the policy which was informed by the 
predominant discourses. 
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